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DRIFTING DOWN THE DNIEPER
WITH PRINCE POTEMKIN: SOME SKEPTICAL
REFLECTIONS ABOUT THE PLACE OF COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Frank 0. Bowman, III*
And, as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name. 1
I was pleased and honored to accept the Wake Forest Law
Review's invitation to moderate this symposium on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. The topic could hardly
have been more timely. The brobdingnagian Enron bankruptcy in
December 20012 was but the first of a seeming avalanche of
scandals, failures, and misadventures among the titans of American
business. The cascade of evil tidings was for a time so unceasing
that fears for the future of American capitalism were openly voiced
in the media and the halls of Congress.3 Bad news provoked
political frenzy, and frenzy played midwife to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act 4 and a bawling litter of new laws and regulations designed to
strike down corporate evildoers and nurture the better angels of
good corporate governance.5
* M. Dale Palmer Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis. I am grateful to the staff of the Wake Forest Law Review, and
particularly Christopher Gyves, for the invitation to appear at the symposium
and for their hospitality throughout the event. Many thanks, as well, to
Professors Alan Palmiter and Ronald Wright for their work in helping put
together the symposium, and for their insightful comments on this subject and
other recent projects. Finally, I am grateful to Phillip Long for his work editing
this article.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM act 5, sc. 1.
2. At the time it occurred, the Enron bankruptcy was the largest in the
history of the United States. Explaining the Enron Bankruptcy, at
http://www.cnn.conV2002fUS/01/12/enron.qanda.focus/index.html (last visited
May 25, 2004).
3. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H1545-46, H1584-85 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002)
(remarks of Rep. Kanjorski); id. at H1544 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (remarks of
Rep. Oxley).
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
5. For discussions of the civil regulatory side of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
HeinOnline  -- 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 671 2004
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
I have told the tale of the criminal provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 and the ensuing amendments to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines elsewhere.6 At least one thread of that story
is relevant here. When the political classes concluded that the
enormity of the wave of corporate scandal required a response, the
question arose as to whether punitive criminal or civil regulatory
responses would be best. Republicans were only reluctantly in favor
of either. Democrats wanted both. The White House elected to
portray the problem as one of criminal wrongdoing by a relative few
individuals in order to quell rising enthusiasm for far-reaching
regulation of corporate conduct.8 The result was a bipartisan push
for tough criminal legislation aimed at corporate fraud.9 The
problem for the legislators and their staffs was that, when they
began casting about for laws to change and sentences to rise, they
found that the federal criminal statutes already covered almost
every conceivable form of serious corporate misbehavior. ° On the
penalty side, the U.S. Sentencing Commission had beaten Congress
to the punch by passing, in November 2001, a package of economic
crime sentencing reforms that substantially increased the sentences
of mid- to high-level white-collar offenders.11  In addition, the
Commission had already formed a blue ribbon Ad Hoc Advisory
Group that was in the process of evaluating the Sentencing
see John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 336-43 (2004); Lawrence A.
Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It
Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003).
6. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour encourager les autres? The Curious History
and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 373 (2004) [hereinafter Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley Act]; Frank 0.
Bowman, III, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and What Came After, 15 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 231 (2003).
7. Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 6, at 392-98.
8. Id. at 399.
9. Id. at 400-01.
10. See Penalties for White Collar Crime: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Crime and Drugs of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 42-43
(2002) (responses by Frank 0. Bowman, III to written questions following
hearing of June 19, 2002); Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 6, at 402-
05.
11. For discussions of the 2001 Economic Crime Package, see Frank 0.
Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms: An
Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5 (2001); Frank 0. Bowman,
III, A Judicious Solution: The Criminal Law Committee Draft Redefinition of
the "Loss" Concept in Economic Crime Sentencing, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 451
(2000); Frank 0. Bowman, III, The 2001 Economic Crime Package: A Legislative
History, 13 FED. SENTENCING REP. 3 (2000); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Coping with
"Loss": A Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal Economic Crimes Under the
Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461 (1998); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Back to Basics:
Helping the Commission Solve the "Loss" Mess with Old Familiar Tools, 10 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 115 (1997).
[Vol. 39
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Guidelines for Organizations. 2 Slightly baffled, but nonetheless
determined to legislate, Congress cobbled together an array of
provisions that fractionally expanded the reach of several existing
criminal statutes, raised statutory maximum sentences for several
common kinds of fraud, and issued directives to the Commission
intimating, or in some cases commanding, that some white-collar
sentences should be raised still further.
13
Oddly enough, although the Sarbanes-Oxley furor was about
mismanagement, scandal, and crime in large corporate
organizations, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act virtually ignored that portion
of federal sentencing law expressly designed to address corporate
conduct-the organizational sentencing guidelines. The Act
contains only one line about the organizational guidelines. Section
805(a)(5) declares that "the United States Sentencing Commission
shall review and amend, as appropriate, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and related policy statements to ensure that . .. the
guidelines that apply to organizations in United States Sentencing
Guidelines, chapter 8, are sufficient to deter and punish
organizational criminal misconduct." 4 Since the Ad Hoc Advisory
Group was already evaluating the organizational sentencing
guidelines, § 805(a)(5) amounted to little, if anything, more than an
admonition to the Commission to keep doing what it was already
doing.
It is interesting to speculate about why Congress had so little to
say about the organizational guidelines in Sarbanes-Oxley,
particularly in light of the solons' willingness to command quite
specific alterations of the guidelines for individual defendants. One
strongly suspects that few of the relevant congressional actors or
their staffs even knew that there was a separate set of
organizational guidelines. One also suspects that, even among those
who did know such guidelines existed, few had any real
understanding of how they work. But it is also possible that those
on Capitol Hill who knew of and basically understood the
organizational guidelines thought they were reasonably sound and
were, in any case, undergoing a process of study and revision which
required no immediate congressional intervention. To the extent
that anything like the last suggestion was at work, it is consistent
with my entirely impressionistic sense of how the organizational
guidelines are viewed in the broader legal community. That is, in
contrast to the federal sentencing guidelines for individuals, which
12. See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Sentencing Commission
Convenes Organizational Guidelines Ad Hoc Advisory Group (Feb. 21, 2002),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel0202.htm.
13. Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 6, at 404-05; The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act: Sentencing Provisions, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 254 (2002).
14. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 805(a)(5), 116 Stat.
745, 802.
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have been the subject of endless critical commentary,'5 the
consensus about the organizational sentencing guidelines seems to
be pretty positive. At the very least, they are not the subject of the
impassioned cries for reform that characterize the conversation
about the guidelines generally.
Why the difference? Part of the answer may be nothing more
than popular indifference to criminal punishment of corporations.
As we will see momentarily, very few corporations suffer criminal
convictions and sentences. And when such convictions happen,
corporations, as has been famously observed, have "no soul to be
damned, and no body to be kicked."16  Thus, their collective
punishments, which necessarily take the form of monetary fines or
legal prohibitions from engaging in certain activities, simply do not
engage the emotions in the way that confinement of a human being
in a cell does. But even among those who make it their business to
care about crime and punishment, the organizational sentencing
guidelines seem to enjoy greater support than the rest of the federal
sentencing structure. So the question remains why that sentiment
exists. This essay takes a very brief stab at explaining the relative
popularity of the organizational sentencing guidelines. But the
major thrust of my argument is the suggestion that such popularity
as they enjoy rests in part on widespread misunderstanding of how
a central component of the organizational sentencing guidelines-
the incentives for creation of corporate "compliance programs"-
works in practice.
I am not an expert in management or corporate governance. My
expertise, if any, is in prosecuting and punishing corporeal people
for crime. But at least from that perhaps uninformed perspective,
the portion of the organizational sentencing guidelines devoted to
compliance programs seems awfully like a legal Potemkin village. 7
15. See, e.g., KATE STITH & Josg A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998); Daniel J. Freed,
Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992). For reviews of the Stith
and Cabranes book, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear
of Judging and the State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LouIs U.
L.J. 299 (2000) (book review); Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing
Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355 (1999) (book review).
16. The remark is attributed to Edward, First Baron Thurlow. Gilbert Geis
& Joseph F.C. DiMento, Empirical Evidence and the Legal Doctrine of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 341, 342 n.3 (2002) (citing John
C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981)).
17. The phrase "Potemkin village" was coined to describe the efforts of
Prince Grigory Aleksandrovich Potemkin to spruce up the route of Tsarina
Catherine the Great's royal progress through the Ukraine and the Crimea in
1787. According to legend, Potemkin went so far as to have phony villages
constructed along Catherine's route, much of which followed the Dnieper River
on which the court moved by barge. His objective was to impress the Tsarina
with his success in administering the area. In fact, there is considerable doubt
[Vol. 39
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It looks great as the Tsarina sails by on her barge. It has made a
bundle of money for the compliance officers and outside consultants
who have been busily constructing the facade. But there is precious
little evidence that all this scurrying about on the riverbank has
moved either the barons or the serfs of corporate life to commit less
crime. Moreover, such evidence as exists reveals that the
compliance components of the guidelines have virtually no effect
even within the criminal sentencing system. Thus, what follows are
the questions of a puzzled, if persuadable, skeptic.
I. A RUDIMENTARY PRIMER
IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Organizations are not persons except in the technical juridical
sense, but the criminal law permits them to be charged, convicted,
and sentenced for crime just as though they were creatures of flesh
and blood.1" Of course, an organization can neither act nor think
except through the actions and thoughts of the individuals of which
it is composed. Hence, organizations are found "guilty" of crime by
attributing to the collective the acts and mens rea of its members.' 9
Except in the case of purely criminal organizations like the Mafia, a
convicted organization will almost invariably consist of both guilty
and innocent persons, but punishment imposed on the organization
will probably affect both. So the objectives of criminal punishment
of organizations ought to include (a) preventing or reducing the
incidence of organizational wrongdoing; (b) compelling the
organization to remedy the harm its criminality has caused to
others; (c) minimizing the harm imposed by the punishment on the
innocent members of the organization; and (d) where possible, and
excepting the case of a purely criminal organization, allowing the
organization to continue to perform its beneficial social and
economic functions.
The designers of the organizational sentencing guidelines tried
to craft a sentencing mechanism that would balance all these
that Potemkin ever had wholly false communities constructed, though he
undoubtedly ordered plenty of clean-up in anticipation of the monarch's
passage. Grigory Aleksandrovich Potemkin, in ENCYCLOPRDIA BRITANNICA
(2004), available at http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=62606.
18. For a discussion of the anthropomorphic quality of corporate criminal
liability, see Richard T. Oakes, Anthropomorphic Projection and Chapter Eight
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Punishing the Good Organization When It
Does Evil, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 749 (1999).
19. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,
494-95 (1909) (upholding vicarious liability of a corporation for the acts or
omissions of its employees); see also Developments in the Law-Corporate
Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 1227, 1247 (1979) ("[A] corporation may be held criminally liable for the
acts of any of its agents if an agent (1) commits a crime (2) within the scope of
employment (3) with the intent to benefit the corporation.").
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sometimes conflicting objectives. The organizational sentencing
guidelines occupy a separate chapter, Chapter Eight, in the
Guidelines. They were not adopted until 1991, four years later than
the first guidelines for individual defendants, and they were the
product of a separate and somewhat more leisurely drafting20
process. The sentencing process under the organizational
sentencing guidelines consists of three major parts. The first thing
a judge is to do when determining a penalty under Chapter Eight is
to "[dletermine ... the sentencing requirements and options relating
to restitution, remedial orders, community service, and notice to
victims."21 Court-mandated remediation can include both an order
of monetary restitution2 2 and other types of corrective action such as
a product recall or clean-up program.2  Next, the court is to
• 24
determine the fine to be imposed on the organization. Finally, the
court must consider whether probation would be an appropriate part
of the sanction.25
Despite the (undoubtedly laudable) emphasis on remedial
measures, the centerpiece of the organizational sentencing
guidelines is their structure for imposing fines. The Guidelines
divide organizations into two categories for purposes of imposing
fines. Consistent with the principles that punishment of
organizations should endeavor to prevent crime while minimizing
the harm to innocent members and allowing the organization to
continue performing any socially or economically beneficial function
it may serve, the Guidelines seek to shut down purely criminal
organizations by divesting them of all their assets.26  All other
organizations are subjected to fines designed to prevent crime, but
not, at least in theory, to cause the destruction of the entity. v
Organizational fines are determined as follows. First, the court
calculates the base fine, which will be the greatest of (a) the gain to
the organization from the crime; (b) the loss caused by the crime, if
20. Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings,
and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 208 (1993).
21. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8A1.2(a), 8B1.1-B1.4 (2003).
22. Id. § 8B1.1.
23. Id. §§ 8B1.2, cmt. background, 8B1.3, cmt. background.
24. Id. § SA1.2(b).
25. Id. §§ 8A1.2(c), 8D1.1-8D1.5. The Guidelines suggest a number of
situations in which imposition of probation would be appropriate including the
need for ongoing court supervision to ensure payment of a fine or
accomplishment of court-ordered remedial measures. Id. § 8D1.1(a)(1)-(2). For
discussion of organizational probation, see Gary S. Green, Organizational
Probation Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 62 FED. PROBATION 25
(1998).
26. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C1.1; see also Nagel &
Swenson, supra note 20, at 232-33.
27. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C2.2-8C4.11; see also Nagel
& Swenson, supra note 20, at 233.
[Vol. 39
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caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; or (c) an amount
derived from a chart in § 8C2.4(d) and based on the offense level
under Chapter Two of the Guidelines for the offense of conviction.28
Second, the court determines a "culpability score." This score is
calculated by beginning with a base score of five, and adding and
subtracting points.2 Factors thought to measure offense seriousness
such as large organizational size, involvement of high-level
corporate personnel in the crime, a prior history of legal violations,
violation of a court or administrative order, and corporate conduct
31
amounting to obstruction of justice increase the culpability score.
Factors suggesting good corporate citizenship before and after
detection of the offense reduce the culpability score. The most
significant of these factors are the presence at the time of the offense
of an "effective program to prevent and detect violations of law" (a
compliance program) 1 and self-reporting, cooperation with the
authorities, and acceptance of responsibility once the offense has
occurred .
The Guidelines actually list seven minimum attributes of an
"effective" compliance program:
(1) Establishment of "compliance standards and
procedures" that are "reasonably capable of
reducing the prospect of criminal conduct";
(2) Assignment of responsibility for compliance to
"high-level personnel" within the organization;
(3) Use of "due care" to ensure that those assigned
compliance responsibility do not have a
"propensity to engage in illegal activities";
(4) Taking steps to communicate the established
standards and procedures to all employees;
(5) Creation of monitoring and auditing systems to
detect criminal conduct and creation of a
reporting system within the organization free of
the "fear of retribution";
(6) Consistent enforcement of standards through
"appropriate disciplinary mechanisms"; and
(7) Taking all reasonable steps after an offense has
been detected to "respond appropriately to the
offense and to prevent further similar offenses."33
28. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.4(a).
29. Id. § 8C2.5.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 8C2.5(f).
32. Id. § 8C2.5(g).
33. Id. § 8A1.2, cmt. n.3(k). The seven requisites of an effective compliance
program listed in the text are drawn from the 2003 version of the Guidelines
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It is important to understand that the compliance programs
encouraged by the Guidelines are designed to promote internal self-
policing. By design, they are not connected to or monitored by any
external agency or regulator. It is not much of an oversimplification
to characterize them as directed primarily at promoting a corporate
culture friendly to whistleblowers.
Third, the court uses the culpability score to assign a "fine
multiplier."3' The fine multiplier is just what the term suggests-a
number (actually a range of numbers) the court multiplies times the
base fine to determine the fine range for the defendant corporation.
To give a simple example, if a corporation with more than 5000
employees commits an offense in which a number of sales managers
were involved and causes a loss of $10 million, the culpability score
would be ten, the fine multiplier would be two to four, and the fine
range would be $20 to $40 million.3  By contrast, if the same
corporation had an effective compliance plan and self-reported the
offense, the culpability score could, in theory, be as low as two, in
which case the fine multiplier would be 0.40 to 0.80, in which case
the fine range would be $4 to $8 million.3 7 As with the sentencing
ranges for individual defendants, the sentencing judge has largely
unfettered discretion to set the final sentence within the fine
38
range.
The foregoing example suggests several points important for the
remainder of this discussion. First, the theory of the organizational
sentencing guidelines is not merely one of deterrence through the
imposition of large fines, but is instead a "carrot and stick"
approach.39 The idea is to reduce corporate crime by threatening
monetary pain for legal infractions (the stick) and by fostering law-
abiding corporate culture through the institution of compliance
programs made attractive by the promise of markedly reduced fines
and penalties (the carrot). Second, the example above illustrates
and have been in effect since the adoption of the organizational sentencing
guidelines in 1991. The revised organizational guidelines passed by the
Sentencing Commission in May 2004 retain essentially the same seven
requirements; however, several of them have been made more detailed and the
list has been moved from the Guidelines' commentary into a new guideline of its
own, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 117-19 (2004), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/2004guid/RFMay04.pdf. Assuming congressional
acquiescence, the new guideline will go into effect on November 1, 2004.
34. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.6.
35. Id.
36. Id. §§ 8C2.5, 8C2.6.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 8C2.8 (listing a wide range of factors a judge should consider in
setting the fine within a range).
39. Nagel & Swenson, supra note 20, at 228 (describing the origin of the
phrase "carrot and stick" to describe the organizational sentencing guidelines).
[Vol. 39
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how tempting the carrot might seem to corporate managers told for
the first time about this new regime of federal organizational
punishment. It appears that adoption of compliance programs could
save many millions of dollars in fines (up to $36 million in my
hypothetical). Moreover, even before the Guidelines, indications of
generally responsible corporate behavior were widely (and correctly)
understood to be important to prosecutors' decisions to bring charges
against a corporation in the first instance. It is perhaps not
surprising, therefore, that after the adoption of the organizational
sentencing guidelines, corporate America began to take the liveliest
interest in compliance and that a great deal of the discussion about
the organizational sentencing guidelines has centered on their
compliance-inducing features.
II. THE BIRTH OF AN INDUSTRY
The one thing that the organizational sentencing guidelines
have indisputably accomplished is the creation of a new industry,
indeed almost a new profession. Before 1992, corporations and
those who regulated them were certainly interested in making sure
that laws and regulations were adhered to and that crime by and
against corporations was prevented. To that end, corporations hired
internal and external auditors and legal advisors, submitted to
various governmental inspections and controls, and trained,
40advised, or cajoled their officers and employees according to taste.
But there were no such things as formal "compliance programs,"
corporate compliance officers, or compliance consultants. 4' Now
there are lots of them, and they are the children of the Guidelines.42
40. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 333-63 (discussing various mechanisms for
preventing corporate malfeasance).
41. Historians of government-induced corporate self-policing point to
initiatives taken by defense contractors in the wake of 1980s procurement
scandals as precursors of the compliance movement, but the compliance
industry of today was not born until after the adoption of the organizational
sentencing guidelines. See John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through
Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 310, 313-15 (2004).
42. Judge Diana Murphy, former Chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
has written, "The organizational guidelines have been credited with helping to
create an entirely new job description: the Ethics and Compliance Officer. Such
officers develop and manage an organization's ethics and compliance programs."
Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A
Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 710 (2002)
(footnote omitted). As far back as 1995, Commission studies "reported that
44.5% of corporate survey respondents said their firm had made enhancements
to an existing compliance program because of the guidelines, while another 20%
stated that a compliance program had been put into place because of an
awareness of the guidelines." John R. Steer, Changing Organizational
Behavior-The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Experiment Begins to Bear Fruit,
1317 PLI/Corp. 113, 124 (2002) (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, CORPORATE
CRIME IN AMERICA: STRENGTHENING THE "GOOD CITIZEN" CORPORATION 134
(1995)). Even the providers of compliance program consulting services
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It is important to appreciate the dynamics of the nascent
compliance industry-who is selling, who is buying, and the
strategies the sellers use to drum up customers from the universe of
potential buyers. The first point is that the consumers are medium
to large firms. "Compliance programs" are expensive. They
ordinarily require an outside lawyer or consultant to design and
help implement a plan. They usually involve hiring at least one
internal "compliance officer" or in larger firms creating whole
compliance departments. They require ongoing training of
employees, revisions of the plan, monitoring, and so forth, all of
which necessarily diverts time from profit-generating activities.
Small enterprises cannot easily afford this sort of thing (a point
to which we will return below). Larger enterprises must be
convinced that the expenditure is necessary, or at least desirable.
Even for those who can afford such expenditures, how do the sellers
of compliance services persuade the buyers to buy? If you surf to the
website of any large corporate law firm (or any of the proliferating
consulting firms that offer compliance services),43 you will probably
find one or more pages devoted to arguing that no prudent
corporation should be without a compliance program. Although I
cannot claim to have read every such pitch, all those I have read
make some variant on the same basic four-part argument. First,
aggressive federal prosecutors are bringing ever more cases alleging
corporate criminal liability. Second, the Guidelines and other
federal laws now impose stringent, even crippling, financial
penalties for corporate criminal violations. Third, having an
effective compliance program is critical in dissuading federal
prosecutors from bringing criminal charges against a target
corporation. Fourth, the Guidelines provide very significant benefits
in the form of dramatically reduced fines and other sanctions to a
corporation caught in criminal misconduct if the corporation had an
effective compliance program at the time of the violation. 4 Some of
attribute the birth of their industry to the federal organizational sentencing
guidelines. A study by the Ethics Officer Association reflected that 85% of the
corporate survey respondents created the position of ethics officers in or after
1992. ETHICs OFFICER ASS'N, THE 2000 MEMBER SURVEY REPORT 11 (2000),
available at http://www.eoa.orglEOAResources/Reports/MS2000(Public
Version).pdf; see also Atlantic Information Services, Articles on Compliance
Strategies, at http://www.aishealth.com/Compliance/ResearchTools/RMCRisk
Assessment.html (last visited May 28, 2004) (showing a healthcare consulting
firm's website stating "the whole compliance-program movement began with the
sentencing guidelines' provision on compliance programs that reduces penalties
on convicted organizations if they prove they have a meaningful compliance
program").
43. See, e.g., Atlantic Information Services, supra note 42.
44. See, e.g., Holland & Knight, Stepped-up Enforcement Increases Need for
Corporate Compliance Programs, at http://www.hklaw.com/Publications/
OtherPublication.asp?Article=301 (December 1, 1999); Vorys, Sater, Seymour &
Pease, Many Millions at Stake: Incentives for Implementing Corporate
[Vol. 39680
HeinOnline  -- 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 680 2004
2004] SKEPTICAL REFLECTIONS ON COMPLIANCE 681
the pitches add a fifth consideration-that compliance programs are
taking on importance in civil law, as well, because some government
agencies are beginning to make compliance programs a condition of
obtaining government contracts and because the existence of
compliance programs may impact the liability of directors for
misconduct within the firm.4 5
Perhaps the most interesting thing about the compliance
pitches is what they omit. Compliance theorists spend a good deal
of time extolling the virtues of the "good citizen corporation,"
arguing that ethics training and compliance programs promote
social welfare by reducing corporate lawbreaking and are good for
business because crime is costly. Both of these contentions rest on
the assumption that compliance programs actually do what their
name implies-increase the degree to which corporations and their
employees comply with the criminal law. Yet, at least in the
examples I have seen, the sellers of compliance consulting services
don't waste any ink on the claim that compliance programs work.
Instead, they sell fear-fear that "the feds are gonna getcha," fear
that the Guidelines will produce crippling fines, and fear that
individual managers or directors may face criminal or civil liability
if compliance programs are not instituted. To counter the fear, the
compliance salesmen offer earnest assurances that the best, and
maybe only, way to persuade the government not to prosecute a
corporation whose employees have gone provably astray is to show
good corporate citizenship in the form of an existing compliance
program. And finally, the compliance peddlers earnestly promote
the potentially huge fine reductions provided by the Guidelines for
those organizations that had "effective" compliance programs in
place at the time of the offense.46
Which brings us to the second interesting point about the
Compliance Programs, at http://www.vssp.comnCM Articles/Articlesl031.asp
(last visited June 1, 2004).
45. Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, supra note 44 (discussing In re
Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996), which
held that "a director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to
assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board
concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some
circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused
by non-compliance with applicable legal standards").
46. For example, the web page of Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease devoted to
compliance is titled, "Many Millions at Stake: Incentives for Implementing
Corporate Compliance Programs." Id. The text provides an example of fine
savings and concludes:
The illustration involves a fraud resulting in a loss of $6 million.
Using reasonable (i.e., not extreme) assumptions, it shows that the
presence of a compliance program in such a case could result in a
difference of $8.1 million in the minimum fine, and a difference of
$15.6 million in the maximum fine.
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standard compliance sales pitch, namely that most of the premises
on which it is based are either incorrect, markedly exaggerated, or
unproven. First, the odds that the feds are going to get you are very
low, at least if "you" are a corporation, and the odds have not gotten
that much higher in recent years. As illustrated in Figure 1, since
1997, the total number of organizations convicted and sentenced
nationwide under the Guidelines each year has fluctuated between
two and three hundred.47  As shown in Figure 2, Commission
statistics suggest that of this already small number, only about one-
quarter have more than fifty employees, and only nine percent more
than two hundred. In short, the likelihood that members of the
large firm target market for compliance service providers will ever
be sentenced under the organizational sentencing guidelines is very
small indeed.
On the other hand, there is some evidence that fines are higher
in the Guidelines era than they were before. One study of
organizational cases involving publicly held corporations sentenced
from 1988 to 1996 found that both mean and median fines were










47. Whether more organizations have been subject to criminal prosecution
since the advent of the organizational sentencing guidelines is open to debate.
The Sentencing Commission's data in Figure 1 intimate that this might be the
case, but these figures reflect only cases sentenced under the Guidelines. The
percentage of cases subject to the Guidelines would naturally increase with
each year past the Guidelines' effective date, even if the number of prosecutions
stayed constant. One study found that, at least in the period 1988-1996, there
was no evidence of an increase in criminal sentencings of corporations. Cindy
R. Alexander et al., Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal
Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms, 42 J.L. & ECON. 393, 407-08
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markedly higher in the cases constrained by the Guidelines48 and
that criminal fines now comprise a larger proportion of the total
sanction imposed on corporations (as opposed to sanctions such as
restitution).49 However, the same study found that fines are often
not imposed on organizations, either because the Guidelines do not
cover the offense of which a corporation was convicted or because
(usually due to size) the corporation lacked the ability to pay a fine.50
And another study has suggested that post-Guidelines
organizational fines are no higher than pre-Guidelines fines if one
controls for the economic severity of the offense. 5' Whatever the
truth of the before-and-after comparison, fines under the Guidelines
can be pretty hefty. The Commission reports that in 2001, the mean
organizational fine was $2.1 million and the median fine was $60
thousand.52  An independent study found that the mean fine
imposed on publicly traded corporations sentenced under the
Guidelines between 1991 and 1996 was $19.1 million, while the
median fine was $3.1 million. 3
Thus, a corporate manager familiar with the post-Guidelines
(1999). I am aware of no study that extends from the pre-Guidelines era to the
present.
48. Cindy R. Alexander et al., The Effect of Federal Sentencing Guidelines
on Penalties for Public Corporations, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 20, 21-23 (1999)
(finding that Guidelines cases received fines 470% higher than pre-Guidelines
cases).
49. Id. at 20, 22-23.
50. Id. at 21.
51. Jeffrey S. Parker & Raymond A. Atkins, Did the Corporate Criminal
Sentencing Guidelines Matter? Some Preliminary Empirical Observations, 42
J.L. & ECON. 423, 423 (1999).
52. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 96 tbl. 52 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/2001/
sbtoc0l.htm.
53. Alexander et al., supra note 48, at 21.
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sentencing facts related so far might rationally conclude that the
likelihood of criminal prosecution is low but that the fine costs of
such a prosecution could be sufficiently high that installing a
compliance program makes good economic sense as a form of
insurance against a low-probability, high-exposure event. However,
such a decision is sensible if, and only if, the compliance program
"insurance" will really pay the expected benefits when a corporation
faces criminal investigation and prosecution. And this is the point
where the available data on how the organizational sentencing
guidelines actually work give rise to the greatest skepticism about
the compliance program feature.
Remember that the carrot the organizational sentencing
guidelines offer to induce the creation of compliance programs is the
promise of reduced fines for corporations that create effective
programs and/or self-report criminal violations. But the astounding
fact is that, according to Commission statistics, in the entire history
of the organizational sentencing guidelines, a grand total of three
organizations have ever received a sentence reduction for an effective
compliance program.4  Only eight other sentenced organizations
have been found to have any compliance program, even an
ineffective one.55 And only ten organizations have ever received fine
reductions for self-reporting.56 In short, the promise of a markedly
reduced fine for an effective compliance program is a carrot that
virtually no one ever really gets to eat.
Of course, from an honest corporate manager's perspective,
compliance programs might be worth having even if they don't
accomplish anything at sentencing if either (a) they significantly
reduce the chances of criminal prosecution of the organization after
crime is detected; or (b) they really do prevent crime. The problem
is that there are no useful data on either question.
The Justice Department has twice in recent years promulgated
memoranda setting out considerations to be taken into account in
54. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 98 tbl. 54 (2004); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 98 tbl. 54 (2002); U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 98
tbl. 54 (2001); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 98 tbl. 54 (2000); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1998
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 96 tbl. 52 (1999); U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 96
tbl. 52 (1998); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 70 tbl. 47 (1997); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1995
ANNUAL REPORT 127 tbl. 48 (1996); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1994 ANNUAL
REPORT 129-30 tbl. 60 (1995); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT
171-72 tbl. 69 (1994); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT (1993)
(reporting no sentencing data on organizational offenders).
55. See sourcebooks and reports cited supra note 54.
56. See sourcebooks and reports cited supra note 54.
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deciding whether to prosecute corporations.57 Both list the presence
of an effective compliance program as a factor in making the
decision to indict. However, it is impossible to know how often
compliance programs have played a real role in declination decisions
because the Justice Department does not maintain accurate
statistics on the reasons for corporate declinations and will not
release the information it does have.
I do not doubt that prosecutors contemplating indicting a
corporation routinely consider, as one of many factors, the question
of whether the target company is a good, ethical corporate citizen
that did its best to promote honest behavior and prevent the sort of
wrongdoing that attracted government interest. But prosecutors
have always done that. I know I certainly did. The fact that this
consideration has now been formalized and bureaucratized into a
requirement of an "effective compliance program" does not, so far as
I can see, change very much. It certainly does very little to bolster
the arguments of corporations seeking a declination. If anything, I
wonder whether the Justice Department's adoption of the
"compliance program" as the model of good corporate behavior, and
its implied endorsement of the Guidelines' seven-part definition of
an "effective compliance program," may make it harder for
prosecutors to decline corporate indictments. Historically, a
prosecutor's assessment of corporate character was necessarily
impressionistic; the organizational sentencing guidelines created
seven boxes to be checked before the corporation can claim credit for
organizational virtue. And the new 2004 organizational sentencing
guidelines make the requirements for an "effective" compliance
program even more stringent than they were before.58 Moreover, the
very idea of an "effective compliance program" as a precondition for
non-prosecution is something of a Catch-22. After all, if the
program really had been effective, should it not have prevented the
commission of the crime?
In sum, if I were a corporate manager in possession of all the
facts about how the presence or absence of a compliance program
affects the federal criminal process from charging to sentencing, I
would be tempted to send the lawyers and compliance consultants
packing. I suspect I would conclude that compliance programs are
57. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., to
Heads of Department Components, All U.S. Attorneys, Bringing Criminal
Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), in 66 CRIM. L. REP. 189 (1999);
Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson to Heads of
Department Components, U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
cftf/corporate_ guidelines.htm.
58. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2, cmt. n.3(k)
(2003) with U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES § 8B2.1 (2004) (showing that the new requirements are more
stringent).
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overpriced insurance against a low-probability risk with coverage so
riddled with exclusions that my company would never see any
benefit even if it were caught committing a federal crime. And if I
reached that conclusion, the only argument remaining for
instituting a compliance program would be the one that the
compliance peddlers usually don't make-that compliance programs
prevent crime.
The problem is that nobody knows how much crime, if any, is
prevented by a compliance program. As the Commission's own Ad
Hoc Advisory Group on the organizational sentencing guidelines
conceded:
It has been difficult to empirically test whether the
organizational sentencing guidelines' success in raising
corporate America's consciousness about compliance programs
has translated into the actual prevention or deterrence of
organizational crime, however, and the Advisory Group is not
aware of any empirical evidence that the widespread
movement to adopt compliance programs has resulted in the
institution of effective compliance programs."
I hasten to add that accurate measurement of the prevalence of
corporate crime is probably impossible. Unlike so-called "index
crimes" such as violent crimes, robbery, burglary, or auto theft,
which are committed against victims who know immediately that
they have been victimized and routinely report the offense to police,
white-collar offenses often go undetected and, even when detected,
may go unreported by businesses that prefer to deal with the
problem privately. ° Still, there is every reason to suspect that
compliance programs accomplish little in the way of crime reduction.
In the first place, logic suggests as much. For the small firms
that make up three-quarters of the organizational sentencing
population, compliance programs as a crime prevention tool are
surely a fantasy. Few, if any, of such firms could afford a
"compliance program" that consisted of anything more than
59. REPORT OF THE AD Hoc ADvIsoRY GROUP ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 35 (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/
advgrprpt/AGFinal.pdf.
60. As Sentencing Commissioner John Steer has said:
Any discussion assessing the degree of success in attaining the
ambitious Commission goals for its organizational sentencing
guidelines must begin with a significant concession. With regard to
the hoped for goal of deterrence/crime control, there apparently is no
empirical data that comprehensively chart changes in organizational
crime rates over time (similar to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Uniform Crime Reports data for crimes committed by individuals).
Consequently, for this and other reasons, it is not possible to assess
directly the success, or lack thereof, of the organizational guidelines in
altering the rates at which organizations commit crimes.
Steer, supra note 42, at 123.
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somebody being given the title of "compliance officer," being sent to
a seminar, and posting a few memos. Fewer still would choose to
spend money even on such a paper program. Indeed, why should
they? If the owners and managers of small firms are honest, they
hire lawyers to give them advice about what is legal and
bookkeepers and accountants to keep their finances straight, and
then they themselves provide the managerial oversight to ensure
that what should be done is done. If the owners and managers of
small firms are dishonest, no compliance program is going to
prevent them from stealing from the organization or using the
organization to steal from others.
In medium to large firms, compliance programs, because they
are really little more than inducements for insiders to snitch, are
unlikely to deter or prevent crime at high levels in the corporation.
After all, there are already mechanisms in place for that-corporate
counsel, outside auditors, the SEC, government regulators-which
are much less subject to evasion, manipulation, or control by high-
level corporate personnel. At best, compliance programs might
marginally augment other mechanisms in case of high-level, large-
firm crime.
This leaves mid-level or low-level crime in medium to large
organizations. Perhaps some mid- and low-level crime will be
reported through compliance officer channels that would not have
been reported anyway. Even this is doubtful. Such evidence as
exists suggests that compliance programs do not accomplish very
much in deterring crime or even civilly actionable legal violations.
As Professor Kimberly Krawiec has recently written:
[A] growing body of evidence indicates that internal
compliance structures do not deter prohibited conduct within
firms and may largely serve a window-dressing function that
provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability.
This leads to two potential problems: (1) an under-deterrence
of corporate misconduct, and (2) a proliferation of costly-but
arguably ineffective-internal compliance structures.61
III. THE BOTTOM LINE
The bottom line on compliance programs appears to be this:
they are expensive. They confer virtually no benefit in the federal
criminal process. They won't prevent crime among small firms.
They are exceedingly unlikely to prevent crime involving high-level
owners or managers in large firms. Their utility in preventing low-
and mid-level crime in medium to large firms is, at best, unproven.
One is therefore left to wonder why the compliance paradigm
61. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 487 (2003).
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virtually invented by the Commission has not only endured within
federal criminal law, but has broken containment and is spreading
like kudzu across the American legal landscape.
I will not venture an opinion about the spread of the compliance
cult outside the criminal law, having no expertise in corporate
management and governance or in administrative law. Within
federal criminal law, however, the hardiness of the compliance
paradigm can be fairly readily explained.
In the first place, the "carrot and stick" theory upon which the
organizational sentencing guidelines are based sounds eminently
reasonable. It seeks to combine deterrence with prevention by
moderating penalties as a reward for institutional endorsement of
strategies to reduce criminal behavior. Legal academics love this
kind of thing, particularly when contrasted with the more avowedly
punitive theory and practice of individual sentencing under the
Guidelines. Moreover, the theory underpinning the organizational
sentencing guidelines dovetails nicely with what one scholar has
called "negotiated governance models" of corporate behavior, and
thus the Guidelines' compliance features garner support from
management theorists.
We have already seen that white-collar defense lawyers have
embraced compliance with an almost evangelical fervor, albeit a
fervor that seems suspiciously related to the prospect of filling up
the collection plate. The new and growing professions of internal
ethics and compliance officers and external ethics and compliance
consultants are unlikely to question the premises upon which their
paychecks are based. And federal judges have had little to say
about compliance programs, largely, one suspects, because the issue
never comes up in their courtrooms and is unlikely ever to do so.
As for the Justice Department, it is no less subject to the power
of widely accepted myths than any other institution, and therefore it
may have bought into the compliance movement on the assumption
that compliance programs really work. But even if Justice
Department policymakers have a more clear-eyed view of
compliance, from the government's point of view, the compliance
provisions of the Guidelines hurt nothing and may help the
prosecution do its job. In the first place, the government need not
worry that compliance programs will routinely reduce defendants'
fines to unacceptably low levels since, as we have seen, only three
such reductions have ever occurred. In the second, even if
compliance programs are only marginally effective in preventing
crime, the Justice Department does not bear the cost of such
programs and might easily view some crime reduction as better than
none. Finally, the Justice Department's primary focus is on
detecting and prosecuting crime, and thus the proliferation of
62. Id. at 516-22.
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corporate compliance programs makes sense if such programs
encourage at least some whistleblowers to come forward and at least
some companies to self-report their offenses. Again, the cost-
effectiveness to corporations of such marginal gains is not likely to
be a big concern of professional prosecutors.
In the end, it is no wonder that the managers of corporations
that can afford them are spending ever more money erecting
compliance regimes. They read daily of high-profile federal
prosecutions, big fines, and jail sentences for corporate executives.
The Justice Department wants compliance programs. The
compliance cult has spread beyond the criminal law and has
penetrated the regulations of agencies with which the company
wants to do business or by which the company is regulated. Their
lawyers tell them compliance programs are a must. Their
competitors have shiny new ethics officers. They worry that failure
to buy the newfangled form of insurance purportedly offered by a
compliance program will cost their companies staggering sums and
themselves their jobs and reputations. They don't know that the
insurance is worthless, at least in the federal criminal sentencing
system. Even if they did, it might not matter because they may
conclude that the erection of a pasteboard facade of organizational
rectitude is a small price to pay for convincing whichever Tsarina is
looking over their shoulders that they are exemplary administrators
of their own corporate provinces. And so they pony up, and another
seven-step compliance bureaucracy is born.
IV. CONCLUSION
I cheerfully admit that the foregoing remarks may be an
unfairly jaundiced perspective on a commendable experiment in
corporate sentencing. Although it turns out that the presence or
absence of corporate compliance programs has virtually no effect on
corporate sentencing, the illusion that sentences are affected by the
presence of programs promotes the creation of programs. However,
since the programs never actually reduce anyone's fine, the fine
provisions of the Guidelines, in tandem with the provisions imposing
incarceration on individuals, continue to perform their deterrent
function and compliance programs proliferate, which may be
entirely to the good. After all, even if there is no hard evidence that
compliance programs work to reduce corporate crime, neither is
there any hard evidence that putting corporate executives in prison
or imposing huge monetary fines on companies accomplishes that
end. In the end, both the conventional deterrence approach and the
newer self-regulatory approach to corporate crime rest upon a series
of commonsense, but largely unproven, understandings about the
way individuals and groups behave. As curmudgeonly as I may
sound on the subject of compliance programs, it is still pretty hard
to resist the commonsense notion that an organization that has a
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plan and an internal mechanism for promoting lawful behavior will
be more likely to behave lawfully. The purpose of these remarks is
simply to point out that those deciding to adopt compliance
programs may be operating under some misapprehensions about
their benefits in the federal criminal process, and to wonder, just a
bit, about whether the speculative benefits of the compliance
movement generally may be outweighed by their costs.
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